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James Scott’s volume is a broad, compelling paean to the
political agency and power of those who have been writ-
ten out of history as backward and premodern—the peo-
ple who resist states and create alternative forms of social
and political governance. It is a cautionary tale for policy-
makers, scholars, military planners, and would-be state
builders about the limits of state power and legitimacy,
but also something of a guidebook on how to tame them.
Scott’s eulogy for polymorphous human societies appears
premature, however, given the many alternatively gov-
erned structures currently enabled by geographical remote-
ness, population density, globalization, and the state itself.
The Art of Not Being Governed is troubling, less because it
questions the morality of the state as a sociopolitical form
than because it romanticizes nonstate peoples who seek
violently to repel and escape the state.
Scott highlights the often despotic and dehumanizing
effects of state building on human beings. Historically, he
shows that states have been much more concerned with
controlling people and resources than providing security
or state services. His sweeping account of state making
makes this point beautifully, emphasizing the roles that
slavery, forced labor, and population control played in
state development from Western Europe to Southeast Asia.
For Scott, resistance to political incorporation into a state
is equivalent to asserting one’s liberty to choose whether
and how one is governed. Scott’s work is a lament—for a
world thought to be more filled with agency and therefore
more multidimensional in form and voice than ours is
said to be today. It is a wonderful account of the centuries-
long enclosure of peoples into states. Prior to the mid-
twentieth century, Scott argues, myriad types of social and
political governance structures predated today’s flattened,
homogenized world of centralized territorial states. Today,
he maintains, arbitrary lines on a two-dimensional map
define polities and societies and destroy the fundamental
liberty and agency of individuals.
State building, therefore, has always provoked deliber-
ate efforts to “escape” (p. 23) and “repel” (pp. 180–91) the
state, and so the story of the state is also a story of “non-
state spaces” (p. 10). This detailed account is ironically a
primer for state builders wanting to gain control over such
spaces. Scott argues that these strategic efforts occurred
not only geographically, in flight from state spaces to remote
areas (hills and swamps) where nonstate peoples could
easily disperse if pursued, but also agriculturally, in their
slash-and-burn land-stewardship methods and choice of
crops. He links the choice to escape the state as well with
nonstate peoples’ political and social structures (frag-
mented, horizontal), cosmologies (always seeking to recover
a lost paradise), identities (inclusive, dynamic, and respon-
sive to economic opportunities, rather than primordial
and hard-wired), and, least credibly, their literacy (strate-
gically lost, as a way to avoid being “legible” by states).
Scott claims to be engaging in a “radically constructiv-
ist” account of Southeast Asian history in order to high-
light the agency of those choosing to be stateless and the
invention of ethnic identity and tribalism (p. 256). His
account, however, is at root rationalist and functionalist,
as nonstate peoples’ choices—even the choice to “lose
literacy”—are all portrayed as optimal strategies for escap-
ing state control. States and nonstate peoples adopt iden-
tities that are politically and economically beneficial given
their environmental constraints, which accords more with
an instrumental rather than a constructivist account.
Scott’s work offers several cautions regarding “un-
governed spaces,” currently of much concern to policy-
makers in the United States and globally, who regard them
as organizing spaces for nonstate actors that threaten
national and international security.1 His work on non-
state societies strongly reinforces arguments that such
“ungoverned” spaces have always existed, and are more
appropriately termed “alternatively governed” spaces.2 Scott
highlights the mutually constitutive nature of state and
nonstate spaces, and underscores that alternatives to state
governance have existed as long as there have been states
to act as their foil. He demonstrates quite powerfully that
there is nothing new in the notions of ungoverned spaces,
or in state failure or state fragility; these concepts are as
old as the hills that provide refuge to those seeking to
escape the state. Nor are they necessarily threats to the
state (pp. 106–8).3
Scott emphasizes the historical limits of state building
and implies that authoritarian regimes are bound to fail in
their efforts to control people, even if only at the margins.
He indicates that over the long durée, states and statelets
rise and fall with war, disease, and ecological disaster, with
each creating nonstate spaces and peoples. In this story,
state failure is common and state building is a punctuated
process, waxing and waning depending on environmental
factors and war. For our own epoch, the lesson is that state
building is an ongoing rather than finite process and that
nonstate spaces are endemic. Today’s environmental fac-
tors that shape state success and failure continue to include
hostile neighbors, war, disease, and environmental catas-
trophe (as the recent deluge in Pakistan all too tragically
highlights). Added to these factors are current conditions
of economic and financial interdependence, allowing for
new sources of state crisis, collapse, and expansion.
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Policymakers therefore have centuries of history to mine
for lessons about state-building efforts in such alterna-
tively governed areas. One finding is that efforts to create
“stateness” at the local level fall flat, as Scott demonstrates,
in spaces dominated by headless (acephalous) forms of
social organization, such as the Pashtun border areas of
Afghanistan and Pakistan. His discussion of the many
efforts of expanding states—especially colonial ones—to
create hierarchy among such societies is an important les-
son for contemporary postconflict reconstruction efforts
in Africa, Iraq, and Southwest Asia (p. 258). More funda-
mentally, the central lesson he highlights is that efforts to
create alternative governance will always emerge wherever
there is state authority, as a result of a constant dialectic of
power and resistance.
This cautionary tale, however, underscores one of the
main theoretical and policy shortcomings of Scott’s work:
its historical limitation to the era predating the end of
colonialism in the mid-twentieth century. While the state
form is both dominant ideologically and ubiquitous ter-
ritorially, as Scott correctly notes, resistance to it is alive
and, if policymakers’ warnings are to be believed, kicking.
These alternatively governed spaces now often take on
forms that belie the omnipotence and omnipresence of
the state. Either they have persisted in the remote reaches
of territorial space or they have been transformed through
global markets and diffusion of ideological and technolog-
ical innovation.
For Scott, the current era is one in which “virtually the
entire globe is ‘administered’ space and the periphery is
not much more than a folkloric remnant” (p. 324). On
one level this is undoubtedly true. The diversity in socio-
political territorial forms that predated the modern era
has all but disappeared. Alternatively governed spaces were
not, however, eradicated by the state in the late twentieth
century. Scott’s description of the precolonial era seems
appropriate to many places today: “[S]overeignty was
ambiguous, plural, shifting, and often void altogether”
(p. 61). Such a description certainly fits that given by
proponents of a new medievalism.4
Today’s nonstate spaces reside within and across “admin-
istered space,” and many of them still operate to evade or
repel Leviathan, not simply tame it (p. 324). In these
areas, nonstate organizations generate rules and govern.
They are shaped as much by global and regional flows of
goods, people, ideas, and wealth as by the existence of
states. All of these alternatively governed spaces, as those
in Scott’s account, are in an ongoing dance with state
spaces and the varying levels of state control across them—
whether in stable or failing states, states with robust, lax,
or no regulation, “quasi-states,” or “effectively sovereign”
ones.5 Today’s world is one of softening sovereignty, not
its hardening or replacement.6 As Stephen Krasner has
noted, state sovereignty has always been mythic in its claims;
peripheries and interstitial spaces have always existed.7
Some nonstate spaces are still recognizable as the head-
less societies that are Scott’s focus. These societies persist,
providing governance in some of the alternatively gov-
erned spaces that most trouble Western policymakers today:
the mountainous borderlands of Pakistan and Afghani-
stan, Yemen and Saudi Arabia, and the Andes. He is incor-
rect, however, to associate nonstate spaces and peoples
predominantly with territorial remoteness. Today, liminal
spaces of the global economy and Internet, and cities and
urban spaces can all resemble the remoteness of hilly South-
east Asian refuges.8
Global forces—from business, media, people, goods,
and services to information and ideas—now penetrate vir-
tually the entire planet with far greater intensity than in
previous eras, providing “nonstate peoples” newly avail-
able avenues for evasion of, autonomy from, and resis-
tance to state forces. In some areas, these take the form of
“foreign fighters,” hosted as guests by Pashtun tribes, who
provide training, funds, and ideas of jihad in order to
reject and resist the authority of states.9 In others, they
manifest as nongovernmental organizations providing train-
ing, money, and ideas of rights to life, liberty, property,
and autonomy, and freedom from abuse and tyranny.10
Transnational corporations and NGOs have created author-
itative rules systems that are market driven, such as the lex
mercatoria, but extend to other realms as well, in the case
of private transnational governance structures.11 Exam-
ples abound, from the failure to control the “offshore world”
of international finance to cyberwarfare to Mexican drug
cartels, whose tentacles reach far beyond their home turf
to a network of gangs laced throughout the drug routes in
North America, and to warlords, business, and govern-
ment forces competing for natural resources in Congo,
Somalia, and Afghanistan.12
In cyberspace, we are witnessing state repelling and resis-
tance, as hackers battle crackers and “cyber warriors.” States
here are still repressive and seek population control in
their virtual terrain, as actions by China, Iran, and many
others with respect to Internet surveillance suggest. They
are quite literally trying to break the open and “hidden
repertoires” of resistance that form online, enabled by
encryption and other technologies.13 The establishment
of the U.S. Cyber Command reflects the growing per-
ceived threat from these liminal spaces.14
These alternative governed spaces profit from arbitrag-
ing jurisdictional boundaries, just as Scott’s do (p. 133),
even as they exist inside of nominal territorial states. In
most cases, these nonstate actors and nonstate spaces need
the state; therefore, they do not seek to replace it, rather
to profit from the nature of statehood—its territorial
boundedness.
States, as a result, are feeling insecure about their abil-
ities to consolidate and monitor—to make legible, in Scott’s
terminology—the world’s population and product. We see
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the need to restore effective sovereignty in these “ungov-
erned spaces” and failing states, just as Scott views pre-
modern Chinese and Russian edicts against population
movement and serf uprisings as evidence of the difficulty
in establishing state control (p. 67). Then as now, the
state’s core capacity for such functions—its armed forces—
cannot always be counted on to act in the “national”
interest.15
Certainly, policymakers’ concerns about “ungoverned”
or nonstate spaces suggests that Scott’s core premises—
that states are concerned about legibility and the power of
the weak to resist the state—are correct. Their concerns
also suggest that they believe states are failing to eradicate
nonstate spaces and that “ungovernance” is growing, rather
than being anomalous. Taken together with the literature
on private authority and transnational nonstate networks,
these concerns suggest that Scott’s pronouncement on the
demise of nonstate spaces is untimely.
Morally, Scott’s lament for a bygone polymorphous
world of nonstate spaces and state-repelling societies hangs
on whether there is any merit in the “king’s peace” (p. 67).
The current modernization agenda of state building is
best measured not only in terms of the liberty of peoples
to choose how they are governed (as Scott suggests) but
also in terms of whether those choices of governance yield
predation on the weak by the strong; this is the charge to
create “human security,” not just economic growth. The
author’s distaste for state-based societies is paired with a
rather romantic image of nonstate societies that are more
just, democratic, and representative (p. 9), yet without
sufficient evidence that they are so in fact.
Is it moral for guerrillas, whom Scott terms only a “some-
what limiting” case of state-evading nonstate peoples
(p. 206), to gang-rape freely in Congo or to enslave chil-
dren in Uganda? Is there any moral difference between
state forces and nonstate peoples who do so? Or is it better
for a functioning government to dictate that all such actions
are unlawful and punish perpetrators through incarcera-
tion, forced labor, or death? Nowhere does he address the
moral limits of resistance to the state in the Art of Not
Being Governed, though he provides a number of exam-
ples of nonstate peoples being as repressive as states (pp. 22,
150–52).
It is never entirely clear what constitutes a nonstate
people, in part because their identities are said to be so
plastic and responsive to economic and political incen-
tives (p. 183). From Scott’s functionalist perspective, slave
raiding by Southeast Asian hill tribes and Ugandan warlords
or rapes in the Congo are comparable forms of state-
repelling behavior, and as such a strategic choice to ensure
liberty—at least for the raiders and rapists. Of those peo-
ples caught between the state and nonstate forces, he does
not have much to say, though they may be the majority.
As a result of Scott’s functionalism, virtually any form
of illicit activity, whether it be slavery, drug trafficking,
gang violence or polygamy, can be cast as a state-repelling
act of resistance, regardless of the actors’ actual motives,
which may be simply greed or lust for power. Scott rejects
social contract theory and holds that the state is always
imposed on society. In his “state of nature,” stateless soci-
eties are not inferior to state-based ones and are often cast
as more egalitarian and libertarian (pp. 9, 22). Only democ-
racy provides some relief to citizens from state tyranny
(p. 324). Yet he does not consider what relief peoples,
especially the weak, can seek from a hostile state of nature
and violent nonstate peoples that populate it.
The reader is left to wonder whether Scott omits the
present era from his analysis because to do so would
necessarily cast often inhumane groups—guerrillas,
warlords, terrorists/freedom fighters, narco-traffickers,
pirates, modern-day slavers, and mafias—in the same pos-
itive light as the nonstate peoples of yore. While the
history of nonstate peoples should be documented and
recalled, in Scott’s account the art of not being governed
is often a cruel, unjust, and violent one. As much as
liberty is a moral and philosophical value, so is security
of life and property. Today’s “failed states,” such as Afghan-
istan, Congo, or Uganda, are unable to provide these
values to their citizens, but the moral superiority of non-
state groups, such as the upland Pashtun, Mayi-Mayi,
and Lord’s Resistance Army, is far from evident. Nor is
the superiority of Scott’s precolonial hill peoples who
engaged in slave raiding and trading (pp. 151–53). His
view of nonstate society overlooks its poverty, violence,
lack of liberty, and inequality in order to emphasize the
despotism of states.
The Art of Not Being Governed is a rich and fascinating
account of state building and state evasion that yields pro-
vocative hypotheses and important policy lessons. Scott
views the end of polyform human societies as a present,
sad fact. Reality, however, suggests that state evasion, resis-
tance, and alternative governance structures are alive and
well. Whether this is morally positive is uncertain. Resis-
tance to the state has helped make them more respectful
of human security and liberty and is often the only means
of preserving life and dignity. It also produces ills such as
intrastate war, crimes against humanity, terrorism, preda-
tion, and slavery. These are real problems that result in the
killing and hurting of millions of people around the world
today, and one wishes that Scott had addressed them in
his otherwise impressive study of nonstate governance.
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